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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4760 
___________ 
 
DAVID GLENN LIEPE;  
JOOYEON LIEPE, 
                                 Appellants  
 
v. 
 
ARNOLD GLENN LIEPE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 12-cv-00040) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 15, 2014 
Before:  HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 16, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant David Liepe and his spouse, Jooyeon Liepe, appeal the District Court’s 
order granting Appellee Glenn Liepe’s motion to dismiss.  For the reasons below, we will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
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 The procedural history of this case and the details of Appellants’ claims are well 
known to the parties and need not be discussed at length.  Briefly, Appellants filed a 
lawsuit seeking to compel Appellee, David Liepe’s father, to honor his alleged 
contractual obligations as a co-sponsor of Jooyeon Liepe’s immigration petition.1  In 
August 2013, Appellants signed a settlement agreement and accepted and cashed a check 
in the amount of $7000.  By order entered August 19, 2013, the District Court dismissed 
the case without prejudice to reopening if the settlement was not consummated.  
Appellants affixed their notarized signatures to the release and electronically signed a 
stipulation of dismissal.  But Appellants refused to physically sign the stipulation of 
dismissal.
2
  Out of an abundance of caution, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the case 
with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) based on the settlement agreement.  The 
District Court granted the motion, and Appellants filed a notice of appeal.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s enforcement of the settlement agreement.  Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 
F.2d 1024, 1031-32 (3d Cir. 1991). 
                                              
1
 The record includes an email in which Appellant David Liepe represents to Appellee 
that Appellee’s support obligation would end upon Jooyeon Liepe becoming a legal 
permanent resident – which occurred in January 2010.  Because the parties have settled 
the matter, we need not reach the issue of whether this statement voids or limits any 
contractual obligation on the part of Appellee. 
 
2
 Local Rules require pro se filers to physically sign documents filed with the District 
Court.  Local Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey, Rule 5.2 ¶ 12. 
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 Appellants appear to believe that they are entitled to have their living and 
educational expenses paid by Appellee for an extended period of time.  However, we 
need not reach this question because Appellants agreed to the settlement.  Appellants do 
not dispute that they settled the matter.  Rather, they argue that the settlement was entered 
under economic duress and undue influence, and that it violates public policy.  They 
claim that because Appellee did not meet his support obligations and the District Court 
did not grant them relief, they had no other alternative but to settle. 
 That Appellants might have needed the settlement more than Appellee does not 
constitute bad faith negotiations.  Phillips v. Allegheny County, Pa., 869 F.2d 234, 239 
(3d Cir. 1989).  None of Appellants’ allegations rises to the level of coercion or undue 
influence.  As for public policy, the settlement agreement explicitly states that it does not 
bar any future claim or lawsuit by a public entity against Appellee.  Moreover, Appellant 
Jooyeon Liepe may still seek support from her sponsor and spouse, Appellant David 
Liepe. 
 The District Court did not err in dismissing the matter based on the settlement 
agreement.  Because the parties settled, we need not reach the issue of whether the 
District Court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for partial summary judgment before 
the settlement. 
 For the reasons above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
